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Everyone knows what consciousness is: it is what vanishes 
when we fall into dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake 
up or when we dream1—in other words, it is synonymous with 
experience. Assessing consciousness is often straightforward: 
if we see purposeful, intelligent behavior in a person, we 
assume she or he is conscious. If in doubt, as when someone is 
resting with eyes closed, we can ask the person; if the person 
answers that she or he was thinking or daydreaming, we infer 
she or he was conscious. But at times matters are less clear: 
someone fast asleep shows no purposeful activity and will not 
respond to questions, yet she or he may be dreaming. Similarly, 
some patients with brain damage may be behaviorally unre-
sponsive and thus judged clinically unconscious, yet they may 
be able to generate brain signals indicating they understood a 
question or a command.2,3 In general, the problem is that while 
we assess the level of consciousness based on an individual’s 
ability to connect and respond to the external environment, 
these features are not necessary for consciousness. Yet, to this 
day, we do not have a scientifically well-grounded measure of 
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Abstract
We normally assess another individual’s level of consciousness based on her or his ability to interact with the surrounding 
environment and communicate. Usually, if we observe purposeful behavior, appropriate responses to sensory inputs, and, 
above all, appropriate answers to questions, we can be reasonably sure that the person is conscious. However, we know that 
consciousness can be entirely within the brain, even in the absence of any interaction with the external world; this happens 
almost every night, while we dream. Yet, to this day, we lack an objective, dependable measure of the level of consciousness that 
is independent of processing sensory inputs and producing appropriate motor outputs. Theoretically, consciousness is thought 
to require the joint presence of functional integration and functional differentiation, otherwise defined as brain complexity. 
Here we review a series of recent studies in which Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation combined with electroencephalography 
(TMS/EEG) has been employed to quantify brain complexity in wakefulness and during physiological (sleep), pharmacological 
(anesthesia) and pathological (brain injury) loss of consciousness. These studies invariably show that the complexity of the 
cortical response to TMS collapses when consciousness is lost during deep sleep, anesthesia and vegetative state following severe 
brain injury, while it recovers when consciousness resurges in wakefulness, during dreaming, in the minimally conscious state or 
locked-in syndrome. The present paper will also focus on how this approach may contribute to unveiling the pathophysiology 
of disorders of consciousness affecting brain-injured patients. Finally, we will underline some crucial methodological aspects 
concerning TMS/EEG measurements of brain complexity.
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Figure 1. An empirical approximation of a theoretical measure. 
(left) Loss of integration: perturbing the first element results in a 
short-leaved, local activation involving only the element connected 
to the perturbed one. (center) Integrated information: only in 
this case, perturbing the first element results in a long-lasting, 
widespread yet complex response involving different elements at 
different time intervals. (right) Loss of information/differentiation: 
perturbing the first element results in a widespread activation 
involving all the elements at the same time and then rapidly 
vanishing.
the level of consciousness that is independent of processing 
sensory inputs and producing appropriate motor outputs.
Neuroscience is certainly making progress in identifying the 
neural correlates of consciousness. While many of the proposed 
neural substrates of consciousness undoubtedly have heuristic 
value, empirical evidence still does not provide criteria for 
necessity and sufficiency. For example, measurements per-
formed during seizures4 where subjects are unconscious and 
unresponsive despite increased brain metabolism have sug-
gested that the overall levels of brain activity may not be a reli-
able marker of the presence of consciousness. Along the same 
lines, positron emission tomography measurements have shown 
that brain-injured patients can recover consciousness from a 
vegetative state, without necessarily increasing their brain meta-
bolic rates.5 On the other hand, the hypothesis that the level of 
consciousness could be critically determined by the power/syn-
chronization of spontaneous, fast frequency oscillations in the 
thalamocortical system has been questioned by recent measure-
ments. Indeed, this hypothesis fails to explain the loss of con-
sciousness (LOC) observed during non–rapid eye movement 
(NREM) sleep, propofol anesthesia, and generalized tonic-
clonic seizures, where hypersynchronous broadband oscilla-
tions can be observed.6 As a consequence, even apparently 
simple questions like “Why does consciousness fade during 
early NREM sleep?” and “Why does it resume during dream-
ing?” have been (and still are) unanswered, thus pointing to the 
need for robust empirical studies complemented by a self-con-
sistent, general, and parsimonious theoretical approach.
A recently proposed theory suggests that consciousness 
requires the coexistence of integration and information in thal-
amocortical networks—otherwise defined as brain complex-
ity.7-10 Neurophysiologically, this depends on the ability of 
neural elements to engage in complex activity patterns that are, 
at once, distributed within a system of interacting cortical areas 
(integrated) and differentiated in space and time (information-
rich). In brief, to sustain consciousness, the thalamocortical 
system is endowed with the following 2 properties: (1) infor-
mation—the system has a large repertoire of available states so 
that, when it enters a particular state through causal interactions 
among its elements, it rules out a large number of alternative 
states and therefore generates a large amount of information; 
(2) integration—the system cannot be decomposed into a col-
lection of causally independent subsystems so that, when it 
enters a particular state, it generates information as a whole (ie, 
integrated information, above and beyond the information gen-
erated independently by its parts).
Although integrated information can be measured exactly 
only in small simulated systems, the theory makes clear-cut 
predictions that can be addressed experimentally at least at a 
gross level. As an example, the fading of consciousness during 
early NREM sleep (one of the basic unanswered questions 
above) should be associated with either a reduction of integra-
tion within the main thalamocortical complex (eg, it could 
break down into causally independent modules) or a reduction 
of information (the repertoire of available states might shrink), 
or both. In a word, integrated information should be high when 
consciousness is present and low whenever consciousness is 
lost. Practically, a straightforward way to gauge the conjoint 
presence of integration and information in real brains involves 
directly probing the cerebral cortex (to avoid possible subcorti-
cal filtering and gating) by employing a perturbational approach 
(thus testing causal interactions rather than temporal correla-
tions) and examining to what extent cortical regions can inter-
act as a whole (integration) to produce differentiated responses 
(information; Figure 1). Guided by these principles, over the 
past 10 years we have employed a combination of navigated 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and high-density 
electroencephalography (hd-EEG) to measure noninvasively 
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and with good spatiotemporal resolution the brain response to 
the direct perturbation of different subsets of cortical areas.11
TMS-EEG Studies
At first, we systematically tested the aforementioned theoreti-
cal predictions in a series of controlled experiments aimed at 
measuring the cortico-cortical EEG evoked responses to a 
direct TMS perturbation. Using a 60-channel TMS-compatible 
EEG amplifier, we recorded TMS-evoked brain responses in 
healthy subjects whose level of consciousness was experimen-
tally manipulated under both physiological12-14 and pharmaco-
logical15 conditions, and compared the obtained responses to 
those recorded during wakefulness. We then extended these 
initial observations to the study of pathological conditions in 
which consciousness was impaired and performed TMS/EEG 
measurements in brain-injured patients with a broad spectrum 
of clinical diagnoses, ranging from the vegetative state (VS)/
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) to the minimally 
conscious state (MCS) and locked-in syndrome (LIS).16
TMS/EEG Apparatus
Stimulation Parameters. Stimulations are performed by means 
of a figure-of-8 coil, with a wing diameter of 70 mm, connected 
to a biphasic stimulator. At least 200 trials are usually collected 
for each stimulation site. Stimulations are delivered with an 
interstimulus interval jittering randomly between 2000 and 
3000 ms (0.3-0.5 Hz), at an intensity ranging from 90 V/m up to 
160 V/m on the cortical surface; TMS pulses within this range 
are largely above the threshold (50 V/m) for an EEG 
response.16-18
EEG Recordings. TMS-evoked EEG activity is recorded by means 
of a 60 carbon electrodes cap and a specifically designed TMS-
compatible amplifier (Nexstim Ltd, Helsinki, Finland). The arti-
fact induced by TMS is gated, and saturation of the amplifier is 
avoided by means of a proprietary sample-and-hold circuit that 
keeps the analog output of the amplifier constant from 100 µs 
pre- to 2 ms poststimulus.19 To further optimize TMS compati-
bility, the impedance at all electrodes is kept below 3 KΩ. The 
EEG signals, referenced to an additional electrode on the fore-
head, are filtered (0.1-500 Hz) and sampled at 1450 Hz with 
16-bit resolution. Two extra sensors are used to record the elec-
trooculogram. In most cases, no signs of TMS induced magnetic 
artifact were detected, and in all cases the EEG signals were 
artifact-free from <10 milliseconds poststimulus.
TMS Targeting. Cortical TMS targets are identified on 
T1-weighted MR images of the subjects’ whole heads. To 
ensure precision and reproducibility of stimulation a Brain 
Navigated Stimulation (NBS) system (Nexstim Ltd, Helsinki, 
Finland) is employed. The NBS device locates (with an error 
<1 mm) the relative positions of the subject’s head and of the 
TMS coil by means of an optical tracking system. NBS also 
calculates the distribution and the strength of the intracranial 
electric field induced by TMS. This computation is based on a 
spherical model and takes into account the exact shape of the 
coil and its 3D position and orientation, as well as the overall 
shape of the subject’s head and brain. In this way, the exact 
location of the maximum electric field on the cortical surface 
can be monitored in real time. The coordinates of stimulation 
are then passed to a software aiming tool that ensures the repro-
ducibility of position, direction, and angle of the stimulator 
throughout a single session as well as across different 
sessions.18,20
NREM Sleep
In a first series of studies, we investigated the changes in TMS-
evoked EEG responses during the transition from wakefulness 
to NREM sleep early in the night, when consciousness fades.12 
During wakefulness, TMS triggers a sequence of low-ampli-
tude, high-frequency (ranging from 10 to 30 Hz) waves associ-
ated with a differentiated (in both space and time) pattern of 
cortical activations21 that propagate along long-range ipsilat-
eral and transcallosal connections (Figures 2A and 2B, left). 
Thus, in line with the theoretical requirements, during con-
scious wakefulness a direct cortical perturbation resulted in 
complex activity patterns that are, at once, distributed within a 
system of interacting cortical areas (integrated) and differenti-
ated in space and time (information-rich).
In contrast, during NREM sleep, TMS delivered, with the 
same stimulation parameters, invariably produces a simple 
wave of activation that remains localized to the site of stimula-
tion, indicating a breakdown of communication and a loss of 
integration within thalamocortical networks12 (Figure 2A, mid-
dle). In other words, when subjects lose consciousness during 
NREM sleep, TMS triggers a low-frequency wave, associated 
with a strong initial cortical activation, which does not propa-
gate to connected brain regions and dissipates rapidly. 
Interestingly, the disappearance of a complex spatiotemporal 
pattern of cortical activation is not simply due to a reduction of 
responsiveness of hyperpolarized cortical neurons. In fact, 
when TMS is applied at progressively higher intensity the ini-
tial activation is followed by a larger negative wave that spreads 
like an oil spot to vast regions of the cortex. Particularly, when 
TMS is applied over the parietal cortex this wave reaches 
period-amplitude criteria of a full-fledged sleep slow wave.13 
Thus, during NREM sleep an increase of the spread of the 
response (integration) comes with the price of a loss of differ-
entiation (Figure 2A, middle).
Overall, these results demonstrated that during NREM the 
thalamocortical system, despite being active and reactive, loses 
its ability to engage in complex activity patterns20,21 that are, at 
once, distributed within a system of interacting cortical areas 
(integrated) and differentiated in space and time (information-
rich); it either breaks down in casually independent modules 
(loss of integration) or bursts in an explosive response (loss of 
differentiation/information).
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Midazolam Anesthesia
These observations have been replicated in a recent set of 
experiments where we asked whether cortical effective con-
nectivity would show a breakdown, similar to the one observed 
in deep NREM sleep, during LOC induced by a pharmacologi-
cal agent, midazolam, delivered to healthy participants at anes-
thetic concentrations.15 Similar to NREM, we found that, while 
during wakefulness TMS triggered complex responses involv-
ing multiple cortical areas distant from the site of stimulation, 
during midazolam-induced LOC, TMS evoked a positive–neg-
ative response that was initially larger but that remained local 
(Figure 2B, right). As during NREM sleep, also during mid-
azolam anesthesia, this stereotypical response evolved into a 
full-fledged slow oscillation when the cerebral cortex was 
stimulated at higher intensity.22
Dreaming
One of the most striking paradoxes sleep can offer is repre-
sented by dreaming. In front of us, we have a person lying 
down with eyes closed—as during NREM sleep—discon-
nected from the external environment, almost completely para-
lyzed and unresponsive. Yet, this person is consciously 
experiencing something that closely resembles waking activity, 
and upon awakening is able to verbally report its content. 
Dreamlike consciousness occurs during various phases of 
sleep, including sleep onset and late night, especially during 
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Thus, to probe the internal 
dialogue of the thalamocortical system even in the absence of 
any behavioral cue, we recorded the TMS-evoked responses 
during REM sleep in healthy subjects whose consciousness 
regained in the form of long and vivid dreams.14 Consistent 
with the theoretical predictions, the recovery of conscious 
experience during REM was accompanied by a widespread and 
differentiated pattern of cortical activation similar to those 
observed during wakefulness (Figure 2A, right).
Severe Brain Injury
Finally, we investigated whether a stereotypical pattern of cor-
tical responses (similar to NREM sleep and midazolam anes-
thesia) was present also when consciousness was lost due to 
brain insults.16 To do so, we employed TMS/EEG to measure 
cortical responses at the bedside of VS/UWS patients (ie, 
awake, but entirely unaware). To minimize the possibility of a 
misdiagnosis due to fluctuations in behavioral responsiveness, 
clinical assessment was performed by means of the Coma 
Recovery Scale–Revised (CRS-R)23 repeated 4 times a week, 
every other day. Invariably, the EEG response to TMS was 
characterized by a local, stereotypical positive–negative wave 
similar to those obtained during NREM sleep and anesthesia 
(Figure 2C, left). Interestingly, the same stimulation performed 
in noncommunicative brain-injured patients capable of 
Figure 2. Loss and recovery of integration and information in thalamocortical networks. During wakefulness (A, left), TMS triggers a 
sustained response made of recurrent waves of activity associated with spatially and temporally differentiated patterns of activation (brain 
complexity). During NREM sleep (A, middle), anesthesia (B), and vegetative state (C, left) the thalamocortical system, despite being active 
and reactive, loses its ability to engage in complex activity patterns and either breaks down in casually independent modules (loss of 
integration) or it bursts in an explosive response (loss of differentiation/information). During REM sleep (A, right) and in MCS (C, middle) 
and LIS patients (C, right), the TMS response shows a recovery of recurrent waves of activity associated with spatially and temporally 
differentiated patterns of activation.
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purposeful behaviors, such as visual tracking or response to 
simple commands (therefore diagnosed as MCS), was charac-
terized by regaining a complex spatiotemporal pattern of corti-
cal activations, closely resembling those obtained during 
wakefulness and REM sleep (Figure 2C, right). This similarity 
was even more explicit when TMS was performed in LIS 
patients, who were totally paralyzed except for vertical eye 
movements through which they could signal their awareness 
and establish a nonambiguous, functional communication with 
the external world. Along these lines, in a recent study, 
Ragazzoni and colleagues24 reported reduced cortical connec-
tivity following TMS in VS/UWS patients, as compared to 
MCS patients and healthy controls.
Consciousness and Complexity: From 
Theory to Practice
Theoretical measures based on the idea that consciousness 
relies on the joint presence of differentiation and integration in 
neural systems have been proposed over the past decade.1,25,26 
For example, neural complexity (C
N
)26 is high when small sub-
sets of elements tend to show independence (differentiation), 
but large subsets show increasing dependence (integration). Φ1 
is based on perturbing a system in all possible ways to count 
the number of different states (differentiation) that can be dis-
criminated through causal interactions within the system as a 
whole (integration). A related measure, called causal density 
(C
d
),25 is based on Granger causality and is high if a system’s 
elements are both globally integrated (they predict each other’s 
activity) and differentiated (they contribute to these predictions 
in different ways). Unlike other measures based on the entropy 
of spontaneous signals,27 these theoretical measures share the 
insight that the kind of complexity that is relevant for con-
sciousness should be based on the interactivity among different 





 to actual brains presents substantial practical challenges, 
such as extraordinary computational demands.
The results outlined in the previous section demonstrated 
that during LOC the thalamocortical system, despite being 
active and reactive, loses its ability to engage in complex activ-
ity patterns that are, at once, distributed within a system of 
interacting cortical areas (integrated) and differentiated in 
space and time (information-rich); it invariably either breaks 
down in casually independent modules12 (loss of integration) or 
it bursts in an explosive response13 (loss of differentiation/
information). The aforementioned TMS/EEG empirical mea-
surements thus provide qualitative support to basic theoretical 
predictions and pave the way toward a quantification of brain 
complexity across subjects and conditions, a key requirement 
for a reliable, unified measurement scale.
The Perturbational Complexity Index
In order to capture brain complexity by means of a synthetic, 
quantitative index, we recently developed a theory-driven 
empirical measure, the so called Perturbational Complexity 
Index (PCI), which can be practically employed at the patient’s 
bedside.29 In agreement with the relevant theoretical require-
ments for consciousness, PCI gauges the amount of informa-
tion contained in the integrated response of the thalamocortical 
system to a direct perturbation. The idea is that the level of 
consciousness could be estimated empirically by perturbing the 
cortex (“zapping”) to engage distributed interactions and mea-
suring the information content of the ensuing responses by 
algorithmic compressibility (“zipping”). Operationally, PCI is 
defined as the normalized Lempel–Ziv algorithmic complex-
ity30 of the overall spatiotemporal pattern of significant cortical 
activation measured by EEG and triggered by a direct cortical 
perturbation with TMS (Figure 3). In practice, PCI is expected 
to be low whenever causal interactions among cortical areas 
are reduced (loss of integration), since the matrix of activation 
engaged by TMS is spatially restricted; PCI will also be low if 
many interacting areas react to the perturbation, but they do so 
in a stereotypical way (loss of differentiation). In this case, the 
resulting matrix would be large but redundant and could be 
effectively compressed. It derives that PCI will be high only if 
the initial perturbation is transmitted to a large set of integrated 
areas that react in a differentiated way, giving rise to a complex 
spatiotemporal pattern of deterministic activation that cannot 
be easily reduced.
We tested PCI on a large data set of TMS-evoked potentials 
recorded in healthy subjects (N = 32) during wakefulness, 
dreaming, NREM sleep, and different levels of sedation 
induced by different anesthetic agents (midazolam, xenon, and 
propofol), as well as in a group of patients (N = 20) who 
emerged from coma and recovered consciousness to a variable 
extent. As shown in Figure 4A, experimentally, PCI was repro-
ducible within and across subjects and depended exclusively 
Figure 3. Calculating the PCI. A binary spatiotemporal matrix 
of significant cortical activation triggered by TMS (green star) is 
compressed (“zipped”) by Lempel–Ziv algorithmic complexity. 
Modified from Casali et al.29
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Figure 4. Testing the PCI. (A) PCI values are shown for 152 TMS 
sessions collected from 32 healthy subjects. The histograms on the 
right display the distributions of PCI across subjects during alert 
wakefulness (dark gray bars) and loss of consciousness (LOC; light 
gray bars). PCI calculated during wakefulness (110 sessions) ranged 
between 0.44 and 0.67 (mean = 0.55 ± 0.05), whereas the PCI 
calculated after LOC (42 sessions) ranged between 0.12 and 0.31 
(mean = 0.23 ± 0.04). (B) PCI values are shown for 48 TMS sessions 
collected from 20 severely brain-injured patients. PCI followed 
the level of consciousness (as clinically assessed with CRS-R) 
progressively increasing from VS/UWS through MCS and recovery 
of functional communication (EMCS) and attaining levels of healthy 
awake subjects in LIS. Patient results are directly compared with 
the ones obtained in healthy individuals. (C) Box plots for PCI in 
brain-injured patients are presented with the statistical significance 
between pairs of conditions (dashed black lines). *P < .005. **P < 
.0005. Modified from Casali et al.29
on the level of consciousness in all conditions. Specifically, 
PCI was always high in wakefulness, irrespectively of TMS 
stimulation site and intensity, but dropped drastically when 
subjects lost consciousness in NREM sleep, after administra-
tion of midazolam, and during general anesthesia with propofol 
and xenon. In all these conditions, PCI was invariably reduced 
resulting in a clear-cut distinction between the distributions of 
the conscious and unconscious states. Crucially, PCI was as 
low as in NREM sleep and anesthesia in patients with a stable 
clinical diagnosis of VS/UWS, but was invariably higher in 
subjects who regained consciousness, including MCS, emerg-
ing from MCS (EMCS) and LIS patients (Figure 4B and 4C).
These results indicate that PCI provides an entirely data-
driven metric that is reproducible across different conditions 
(wakefulness, dreaming, LIS, MCS, EMCS, NREM sleep, 
midazolam sedation, xenon and propofol anesthesia, VS/UWS) 
and comparable within and across single subjects in the same 
coordinate space. The main reason for this unprecedented 
result may reside in the fact that perturbational complexity 
gauges, at the same time, both the information content and the 
integration of brain activations. Indeed, PCI combines mea-
sures of algorithmic complexity with a perturbational approach, 
a method that detects large-scale activations that are 
intrinsically causal. Unlike other measures of complexity that 
are commonly applied to spontaneous brain signals, PCI 
accounts only for the information that is generated through 
deterministic interactions within the thalamocortical system. In 
this way, the resulting complexity is not affected by random 
processes, such as noise and muscle activity, or by patterns that 
are not genuinely integrated, such as the ones generated by iso-
lated neuronal sources or common drivers. Most important, 
PCI establishes a reliable measurement scale by defining a 
range of values between various conditions in which con-
sciousness is known to be present (wakefulness, dreaming, 
LIS), and absent (NREM sleep, different types of anesthesia, 
stable diagnosis of VS/UWS).
Finally, another clear advantage of this metric is the fact that 
it can be assessed on the basis of the complexity of cortical 
interactions, thus independent of the subjects’ capacity or will-
ingness to react to external stimuli/commands.
Toward an Understanding of the 
Neurophysiological Mechanisms Underlying Loss 
and Recovery of Consciousness
In addition to improving our ability to detect the presence of 
conscious experience, linking consciousness to brain complex-
ity—in both theory and practice—may also shed new light on 
the cortical mechanisms of loss and recovery of consciousness 
in pathological conditions. Why do complex, long-range corti-
cal interactions collapse into a simple response whenever con-
sciousness is lost?
The striking similarity between TMS-evoked EEG responses 
during sleep, under anesthesia, and in VS/UWS patients sug-
gests common neuronal mechanisms for LOC in these condi-
tions. In all cases, the complex TMS-evoked activation 
observed during wakefulness is replaced by a stereotypical 
positive–negative deflection, which, when TMS is delivered at 
high intensities, evolves into a graphoelement that matches the 
EEG criteria for a sleep slow wave, or a K-complex.13 Animal31 
and human32 intracranial recordings have shown that both 
spontaneous EEG sleep slow waves and K-complexes are 
underpinned by the occurrence of a silent, hyperpolarized 
down-state in cortical neurons, which is preceded and followed 
by a period of activation (up-state). This bimodal alternation 
between up- and down-states reflects an intrinsic bistability in 
thalamocortical circuits that is thought to depend on neuronal 
as well as network properties.33-36 During NREM sleep, bista-
bility may be mainly caused by increased activity of leak K+ 
channels, brought about by decreased brainstem cholinergic 
activity.37 Inhalational anesthetics, including nitrous oxide and 
isoflurane, which strongly potentiate the activity of 2 pore K+ 
channels,38 may act through a similar mechanism. On the other 
hand, increased inhibition within thalamocortical networks 
may play a crucial role in inducing bistability36 in the case of 
other anesthetic agents, which act primarily (such as propofol 
or etomidate), or exclusively (such as midazolam at anesthetic 
doses) on GABA receptors.
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Our proposition is that, due to bistability, portions of the 
thalamocortical system, which are otherwise healthy, would 
not be able to sustain balanced patterns of activations; thus, the 
inescapable occurrence of a stereotypical down-state after an 
initial activation would prevent the emergence of complex, 
long-range patterns of activation in response to a direct 
stimulation.
This occurrence is particularly relevant for brain-injured 
patients. As an example, a direct lesion of brainstem activating 
systems may cause bistability through the very same mecha-
nisms governing NREM sleep. Specifically, brainstem lesions 
that reduce the cholinergic, noradrenergic, histaminergic and 
glutamatergic ascending drive may result in enhanced leak and 
depolarization dependent K+ currents in cortical neurons.37 
Localized alterations, such as undetected cortical epileptic foci, 
can also exert a strong inhibitory drive on brainstem activating 
systems, thus producing diffuse cortical bistability.39
Alternatively, a form of bistability similar to the one 
observed during midazolam-induced LOC may result from 
cortical and subcortical lesions that alter the cortical balance 
between excitation and inhibition in favor of inhibition. For 
instance, recovery of language and motor function after stroke 
can be blocked by excessive inhibitory activity in the peri-
lesional area;40 this excessive inhibition may be generated 
locally or may be projected by healthy areas that become 
hyperactive.41 Thus, cortical lesions that, by themselves, would 
not necessarily impair consciousness may induce LOC by 
causing a general unbalance between excitation and inhibition 
in healthy portions of the thalamocortical system. An excess of 
thalamocortical inhibition from a hyperactive, subcortical 
inhibitory area could also explain the paradoxical effects of the 
sedative zolpidem, a nonbenzodiazepine hypnotic that potenti-
ates GABA
A
 receptors, on behavioral improvement of alert-
ness and interactive behavior in severely brain-injured 
patients.42-44 Another crucial event that may induce bistability 
following brain injury is cortical deafferentation. Severing the 
white matter with a cortical undercut results in slow waves and 
in a continuous alternation between up- and down-states in the 
partially deafferented gyrus, even when the animal and the rest 
of the brain are awake.45
In all cases, evaluating the presence of bistability in the 
cerebral cortex of brain-injured patients is critically important. 
Indeed, while anatomical lesions and disconnections cannot be 
reversed, it may still be possible to reduce bistability and func-
tional disconnections by acting pharmacologically on intrinsic 
neuronal properties.
Experimentally, one should first demonstrate that the slow 
wave-like graphoelement triggered by TMS during NREM, 
under anesthesia, and in VS/UWS patients truly reflects a neu-
ronal down-state (ie, a long-lasting period of membrane hyper-
polarization). Finally, one should demonstrate the causal role 
of bistability by showing that a reduction of TMS-triggered 
hyperpolarization heralds the recovery of consciousness in 
acute patients evolving from coma to different degrees of clini-
cal recovery, and that this is paralleled by a recovery of 
long-range, complex activations at the EEG level, as suggested 
by our preliminary observation presented in Figure 5 (see also 
Rosanova et al16). Both these observations would strongly sug-
gest that bistability may be the common final pathway for a 
collapse of brain complexity causing LOC.
Developing and testing noninvasive neurophysiological 
techniques to these aims is therefore desirable and represents 
an interesting research goal for future studies. As of today, one 
of the most promising noninvasive tool to directly test the 
occurrence of neuronal hyperpolarization associated with a 
stimulation is represented by the event-related optical signal 
(EROS), which measures changes in the scattering of near-
infrared light (occurring synchronously with neuronal firing) 
following a stimulus and combines spatial resolution of few 
millimeters with temporal resolution in the order of millisec-
onds.46,47 A combined TMS-EROS study has been recently 
Figure 5. Longitudinal TMS/EEG measurements in brain-injured 
patients. Recovery of consciousness in a brain-injured patient 
is accompanied by the recovery of complex EEG activations in 
response to TMS depicted here at the cortical source level (colored 
traces). Modified from Rosanova et al.16 Interestingly, the regain 
of EEG complex spatiotemporal dynamics seems to be a stable 
neurophysiological correlate of consciousness regardless of the 
behavioral fluctuations characterizing the clinical evolution brain-
injured patients. The patient here presented was first diagnosed 
as VS/UWS on the day of the first TMS/EEG measurement (left). 
Following repeated CRS-R assessments performed every other day, 
the patient was then clinically assessed as being in a MCS and the 
second TMS/EEG measurement was planned for the next day. At 
that time (center) the patient slipped back into a VS/UWS, yet TMS/
EEG responses captured clear-cut signs of long-range, temporally 
complex dynamics. Within days, the patient was reassessed clinically 
as being in a MCS and then emerged from MCS on the day of the 
third TMS/EEG assessment (right) and showed a consolidated 
complex EEG pattern in response to TMS.
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published, thus confirming the possibility of simultaneous 
coregistration.48 Future studies should then aim at combining 
TMS with simultaneous EEG/EROS recordings in acute 
patients evolving from coma to different degrees of clinical 
recovery, thus linking the progressive recovery of complexity 
in the EEG with the vanishing of neuronal hyperpolarization in 
response to TMS.
Methodological Caveats
For both the quantification of brain complexity and the under-
standing of the neurophysiological substrates of the loss and 
recovery of consciousness, TMS combined with EEG proved 
to be a reliable tool.
Nonetheless, its application, especially in the context of 
brain-damaged, noncommunicating patients, raises some cau-
tion regarding several methodological aspects. An important 
caveat is that, in brain-injured patients, the presence of cortical 
lesions may limit the efficacy of TMS in eliciting a significant 
cortical response (see, eg, VS/UWS anoxic patients reported in 
Rosanova et al16). For this reason, making sure that TMS per-
turbation is not applied to a structurally damaged portion of the 
cortical surface is of paramount importance to gauge reliable 
responses on which complexity can be properly quantified. 
This problem can be faced by employing an imaging-guided 
TMS positioning system to avoid targeting damaged cortical 
sites.49
An associated general issue relates to the handling of scalp 
and source reconstructed EEG signals in brain-injured patients, 
often presenting severely deformed scalp/brain geometries. 
This may lead to imprecise and mislocalized EEG source esti-
mation. The need of accurate head models (via the finite ele-
ment method)50 based on high-resolution magnetic resonance 
images is therefore key in those cases where accurate cortical 
localization of the obtained responses is critical. On the other 
hand, this caveat is less relevant when measuring brain com-
plexity by means of TMS, as an imprecise cortical source local-
ization is not expected to produce changes in the overall 
complexity of the spatiotemporal dynamics of the response to 
TMS.
A more direct caveat is that the EEG signal following TMS 
can be fraught with external sources of noise. In fact, besides 
the magnetic artifact (attenuated/canceled by the amplifier 
sample and hold circuit), other factors (if not adequately con-
trolled for) may confound the interpretation of TMS-evoked 
potentials particularly when performed on noncommunicating 
brain-injured patients who cannot follow commands. For 
example, TMS may directly stimulate or activate trigeminal 
sensory afferents and head muscles, thus evoking somatosen-
sory potentials or muscle potentials, respectively. Scalp muscle 
artifacts lasting up to 50 ms (in the form of spikes time-locked 
with the TMS trigger, with a voltage ranging from hundreds to 
thousands of µV51) are recordable mainly in the most lateral 
and frontal electrodes and can be prevented by stimulating cor-
tical areas underlying scalp regions close to the midline, by 
changing the coil orientation or by decreasing output level of 
the stimulator.
At the same time, eye blinks/movements or auditory evoked 
potentials caused by the “click” associated with the coil’s dis-
charge propagating through air and bone may contaminate the 
genuine cortical response to TMS.52,53 The occurrence of these 
systematic artifacts can be effectively prevented during the 
experiments by employing noise masking and by adjusting the 
coil location and the stimulation intensity.12,18,20,21
Conclusions
Here we reviewed several of the relevant aspects for a theory-
driven empirical assessment of brain complexity based on the 
combination of TMS and EEG. The results are encouraging 
and may be particularly relevant in 2 main aspects.
On one hand, such an approach seems to provide a reliable 
measuring scale along the unconsciousness/consciousness 
spectrum. This represents a first step toward a robust and objec-
tive assessment of unresponsive individuals whose level of 
consciousness is unknown.
Most important, a theoretical and empirical link between 
consciousness and complexity may shed new light on the corti-
cal mechanisms that underlie loss and recovery of conscious-
ness in pathological condition. TMS/EEG measures suggest 
that also in VS/UWS patients brain complexity may collapse 
through network bistability, as it does during sleep and anesthe-
sia. Since bistability is, in principle, reversible and its mecha-
nisms are well understood at the cellular and network level, it 
may represent a suitable target for novel therapeutic approaches 
in patients in whom consciousness is impaired, in spite of pre-
served cortical activity.
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